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New Incentives for
Middle Class Philanthropy:
Radical Funding for the Public Good
SAMUEL M. LOESCHER
"[Nader] and his associates have thus far contributed little more than
rhetoric to the fundamental problem of designing a new structure of financial
incentives for public-interest law practice" (Emphasis added).
Simon Lazarus in The Genteel Populists.'
"Ralph Nader is no accident upon the American scene. He argues a new
way of governing. There will be a rash of Naderism during the 1970's--an
outcropping of advocate planners, keeping the system honest by exerting
constant pressures upon it. Where they are going to find the money,
I'm not sure. (Emphasis added)
Paul Yivisaker in "Utter Chaos or
Simple Complexity," Planning 1970.'
During most of the twentieth century middle class philanthropy has been
substantially confined to propagation of the gospel, benevolences and such other
public goods as United Funds and the maintenance of one's favorite college,
youth club, and medical cause. Almsgiving has been substantially replaced by
governmentally-funded welfare while generalized pioneering for the public good,
to the extent that it persists, has been appropriated by our foundations.
Few would wish to see private associations burdened again with almsgiving, but
many would welcome a resurgence of middle class volunteerism in civic pioneering
for creative public advancement. Such pioneering was far from rare in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Let me cite two examples.3
Prior to the Revolutionary War Benjamin Franklin initiated associational
self-help to organize a library, found a voluntary fire department, establish a
hospital, an educational academy and the American Philosophical Society, and to
plan systems in cooperation with public authorities for the paving, cleaning, lighting
and policing of Philadelphia streetsi During the Civil War the official-sounding
United States Sanitary Commission was privately organized and mass-funded to
improve conditions in military camps and hospitals. Over the initial objections
of President Lincoln, who feared that this voluntary association would become a
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mere "fifth wheel," the Sanitary Commission developed a first-rate reputation as it
inspected, uncovered, and helped correct defects in sanitary arrangements, drainage,
water supply, ventilation and diet. Moreover, the monitoring function of the
Sanitary Commission with its emphasis on visitation, inspection, and evaluation
encouraged the development of other voluntary associations after the war to initiate
the policing of almshouses, insane asylums, orphanages, and schools for the blind.5
The recent expansions in membership and budget of the American Civil
Liberties Union and, even more dramatically, the explosive funding by mail of
newly-founded Common Cause and Public Citizen, all suggest the presence of
evolutionary forces at work in the American political economy that are encouraging a
renewal of middle class associations to monitor powerful institutions and to advocate
in behalf of the relatively powerless.
The rash of whistle-blowing disclosures of citizen professionals which have
alerted us to the multi-billion dollar wastage on C-5As and attack carriers, the
existence of My-Lais, the military assemblage of dossiers on 30 million civilians,
the mass marketing of unsafe pharmaceuticals and automobiles, and the apparent
substantial underpayment of presidential income taxes, have provided another
manifestation of the private provision of public product at real sacrifices to
the provisioners.
What developments have encouraged this new outpouring of pioneering private
philanthropy? What further evolutionary stirrings in organizational development
and tax theory and law promise to both magnify and institutionalize such private
largesse?
I would suggest that realization by the public has gradually been deepening,
since the conclusion of World War H, that the Administrative State is no match for
the Super-Organizational Economy of giant corporations, trade associations, labor
unions, and Farm Bureaus. Moreover, the super-organizations were coming to
be recognized as privileged bastions with respect to perpetuating unequal market
power, unequal access to information, unequal shelter from environmental controls,
unequal shelters from tax levies and unequal beneficiaries of government spending.
Gradually the middle class came to recognize the true significance of the old
clich6 that "Everybody's Business is Nobody's Business."
Item. Merely to persuade logically, historically and with popular support as to
the need for new law to shove realities into conformity with professed ideals does
not assure adoption of such legislation. Witness the prolonged resistance to
progressive tax reform and election campaign finance reform.
Item. Merely to adopt a widely-supported law does not insure its vigorous
enforcement. Witness the eighty-year resistance toward trust-busting, notwithstanding
the Sherman Act's stricture concerning restraints of trade by every "combination
in the form of trust or otherwise."
Item. Merely to establish an agency or commission does not insure that
adequate budgets or first rate administrators or commissioners will be appointed.
Witness the history of the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade
Commission.
Item. Merely to fund generously an agency does not guarantee that all concerned
publics will be adequately represented, and that thereby that elusive entity, the
public interest, can stand a reasonable probability of being attained. Witness the
typical posture of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications
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Commission and the Federal Power Commission as each mediates solely between
conflicting producer interests.
Beginning about 1966, with the growing trade-off of Vietnam fireworks for
other public goods, a miniscule, but non-trivial minority of scattered households
throughout the country, and largely anonymous to one another began to act
economically irrationally. They decided to try to make Everybody's Business at
least Somebody's Business. Moreover, their demonstrated affirmative actions have
had contagious effects, so that three large public interest groups, ACLU, Common
Cause and Public Citizen have collectively raised close to $10 million in 1974.
Such independent giving to private associations for the provision of public goods,
at least to the extent that it is motivated by strictly private economic benefits,
conflicts with the Baumol-Olson thesis on public goods. William Baumol' has
suggested that taxation is essentially a form of compulsory philanthropy in
circumstances where individuals would willingly contribute if everyone else does but
would be unwilling to contribute if other people did not. That an individual will
opt for his own coercion as part of an agreed mechanism to insure the coercion
of other members of his community has been elaborated upon in more detail
by Mancur Olson.! One who contributes independently and voluntarily to a large
collective effort finds that his own contribution generates but an imperceptable
impact; one who fails to contribute receives any supplied collective good whether
or not he contributes.
But Mancur Olson is prompt to admit that his logic of collective action is not
meant to apply to "philanthropic lobbies."' The variety of public interest associations
which gained such financial support during the past decade are clearly concerned
as they see it, with the love of mankind: philanthropy. Hence, the incentive
to contribute is at least partly a moral one. The desire to counter the environmental
wraths of the paper industry is not primarily the high probability that one will
frequently attempt to breathe the stench or fish the bilge of its discharges.
The desire to counter degradation to occupational health wreaked by careless firms
in industries which bring us white, black or brown lung, is not primarily that
one's kin or friends are likely to be fraudulently enticed into employment of an
offending asbestos, coal or textile producer who fails to internalize the full costs of
production. The desire to counter the blandishments and deceptions of the cereal
maker who fills boxes devoid of nutrition is not the probability that one's own
children or their children will become malnourished. Even the desires to enhance the
competitive organization and behavior of the petroleum and automobile industries,
notwithstanding the obviously perceptible income transfer consequent to restrictive
practices and the dynamic wastes of overcentralized planning is probably not the
private gain which the contributor to the public interest organization would receive.
The principal motive behind voluntary contributions to public interest organizations
would appear to reflect a moral one, or at least one of style: A desire to monitor
the uses of power by public and private super-organizations, to protect the
self-respect and enhance the decency of condition of fellow individuals, and to
retard further erosions of the democratic process in the interest of organizational
purposes.
Kenneth Boulding9 has suggested that voluntary contributions in society will
increase: (1) the more pleasurable and individually redeeming is the activity itself,
(2) the more the activity is perceived as being effective in increasing the welfare
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of others, (3) the greater the rate of benevolence, and (4) the less the value of
alternative uses of resources.
I have seen no evidence which suggests that on average our society has become
much more benevolent (3). Most important in encouraging contributions to the
public interest sector has been the greatly enhanced perception of the effectiveness
of such activities in contributing to the welfare of others (2). The growing
consciousness of corporate conglomeration, rising aggregate concentration, an
oligarchical form of pluralism, corporate neglect of consumers, and the emergence
of an unmonitored Administrative State1 o have undoubtedly escalated assessment
of the marginal benefits to be provided by civic monitoring and advocacy.
Some of the most dynamic, intelligent and morally stimulating men in America
have undoubtedly found the public interest work pleasurable and individually
redeeming, as have many of their deputies who have accepted employment at
substantially under-market rates of compensation. Moreover, much first rate talent
has found public interest work so inherently satisfying that they have given
substantially of themselves on a volunteer basis (1). Finally, Steffan Linder in his
thought-provoking, The Harried Leisure Class" has recently suggested that the
volume of time-engaging consumption already achieved by the typical middle class
American and the growing scarcity of time to engage in further consumption
contributes to a dwindling increment of satisfaction from further consumption.
Linder is uncertain if we will chase harder for growing rates of income to offset the
dwindling marginal satisfaction from its consumption or will change heart and
voluntarily reduce the importance placed upon conspicuous consumption. But some
"heart changing" is probable and unless such changers become concurrently less
benevolent, they will not "cop out" and take the bulk of their productivity
gains in greater leisure. Instead, they can be expected to volunteer more of their
income to such altruistic activities as they perceive to generate greater benefit
to the well being of others than the perceived reduction in value of foregone
consumption goods to themselves (4).
The public interest association is thus somewhat unlike the large special interest
association in its capacity to fund voluntarily on an individual and anonymous
basis. Some non-trial financing can be generated on the basis of moral incentives.
But the public interest association is not completely unlike its special interest
counterpart in fund raising potential. Substantially more will be contributed if the
collecting unit can be reduced in size and if greater assurance can be generated
that a significant number of other like-minded citizens will contribute.
Mancur Olson has shown that all special economic groups with significant
lobbying operations possess these lobbying operations as by-products of organizations
which provide a valuable service to a captive audience. Labor unions provide
collective bargaining and grievance machinery; dues which finance the union, and
its lobbying, are typically collected consequent to union or agency shop agreements
by the employer's payroll deduction. Trade association lobbies in industries with
many members are financed as a by-product of trade association membership
undertaken to receive general statistical, technical, and advisory services supplied by
the association. The medical association lobby is substantially financed out of
AMA memberships undertaken to get access to hospital facilities, malpractice
insurance at favorable rates, or AMA journal subscriptions.12 With the exception
of the National Farm Organization all major farm lobbies are financed from
revenues generated as a by-product of the business services supplied by the association.
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Within the past few years Consumers Union has established a consumer
advocacy law firm in Washington, D.C. This auxiliary has already initiated some
significant actions: for example, the quest for disclosure of corporate cost-profit data
allegedly submitted to the Cost of Living Council to justify price increases and a
Sherman Act challenge to voluntary steel import quotas negotiated by the U.S. State
Department and exporting nations. The law firm of Consumers Union will
undoubtedly make an important contribution and may indeed become the
instrumentality by which an antitrust initiative is finally brought, if one ever
surfaces, to dissolve General Motors. But I find it difficult to imagine that either
the membership or subscription revenues from Consumer Reports will so increase
as to permit Consumer Union to vastly expand the role of public interest monitoring
and advocacy which it has already initiated.
The most promising organizational development to enhance greatly the incentive
for middle class contributions to civic monitoring and advocacy is likely to be found
in the example being set by the Student Public Interest Research Group, PIRG,
movement which is spreading rapidly throughout the country. Some 500,000
students are now believed to contribute about $3.00-$5.00 per year to state-wide
PIRGs in about 20 states throughout the United States. First established in Oregon
and Minnesota, as OSPIRG and MPIRG, three years ago, major state-wide
organizations also now exist in Michigan, New Jersey, Maine, Massachusetts and
New York, where NYPIRG is today the nation's largest.
The organizing unit for a PIRG is a college or university campus-where the
population sought for membership all possess at least one essential element in
common: student status at a given institution of higher education. Following an
intensive organizing drive, students will characteristically initiate a petition drive.
A substantial majority of a student population will endorse a petition requesting their
educational institution to assist the signees to tax themselves and all other students
a nominal sum per semester, say $1.50 to $2.50. Funds collected will be used to
finance a public interest research voluntary association which will affiliate with
other units in the state to finance a state PIRG with funds to hire on a sustainable
basis experts in law, economics and the sciences to direct research, to monitor
super-organizations and to advocate reform of governmental and corporate
organizations and practices at the state and local level.
Just as union members will petition or vote to tax themselves and all other
workers in a would-be bargaining unit to pay dues in circumstances where they would
not otherwise individually contribute, so students will opt to coerce themselves to
do what they would be generally reluctant to subscribe to on an independent
and anonymous basis. One major exception in the instance of the student PIRGs
request for university help in administering the democratically-requested coercion
is that objecting students are always guaranteed a refund, following a few weeks
delay, should the objecting students return to request it, at posted times, to the
university's bursar.
The response of the educational institutions has varied. Some administrations
have cooperated in full, even with enthusiasm. Some have resisted the standard
mandatory-refundable fee-and have only acceeded to a negative check-off at
enrollment. Some have been even less cooperative and have permitted the adoption
of only a positive check-off. A few administrations, or trustees have thus far
refused to cooperate at all with the students' petition.
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The importance of the Student PIRGs is that they would appear to portend the
development of Employee CIRGs, Citizen Interest Research Group. The
demonstrated success of the student PIRGs in dealing with utility commissions,
insurance commissions, highway departments, environmental agencies, and their
readiness to push freedom of information issues and the growing publicity surrounding
such matters will be contagious. Their example can be expected to encourage the
far more affluent middle class citizens with up to fifty years active employment
and earning power ahead of them to be responsive to proposals by organizers
who appear at the establishment of their own employment. Moreover, formerly
active participants of the student PIRG movement might be expected to organize
a CIRG at their new places of employment: say, the Caterpillar Tractor complex
in Peoria, the Granite Steel complex of National Steel in East St. Louis, or the
Indiana Standard headquarters establishment in downtown Chicago.
In each instance such graduates of MOPIRG (Missouri), INPIRG (Indiana),
PIRGIM (Michigan), or MPIRG (Minnesota) employed at the prospective
establishment could expect to circulate literature and arrange lunch time meetings
to laud to the employees of, say, the headquarters building of Indiana Standard
Oil the civic virtues in power balancing to be gained by establishing a branch ICIRG,
(Illinois Citizens Interest Research Group). Recognizing that pioneering citizen
associations are likely to emerge for other philanthropic ventures, for example,
the promotion of performing arts, and recognizing further that some employees may
prefer to expand their own giving to such traditional philanthropy as youth clubs
or private colleges, petitioning would probably focus upon winning majority support
to urge one's employer to add ICIRG to the employer's voluntary payroll deduction
plan, thus insuring a status comparable to that already held by United Fund.
Following employer authorization, the CIPG organizers might then seek conditional
commitments to contribute by employees. For example, employees might be asked
to agree to contribute percent of one's monthly salary provided that at least
twenty percent of one's fellow employees would also so commit themselves. By way
of illustration, should at least 400 of an establishment with 2000 employees
commit themselves percent at an establishment where the average annual salary
is $15,000, such a CIRG affiliate would be contributing $30,000 annually to the
state CIRG. Moreover, employee CIRGs operating with the reinforcing assistance
of organizational incentives might easily generate, from such interdependent
contributions, for a state-wide CIRG in Illinois an annual budget of $3,000,000
for hiring professionals and for coordinating the volunteer efforts of off-duty
employee-contributors.
Moreover, organized activity may emerge to encourage the flow of the most
truly atomistic form of private philanthropy, whistle-blowing. CIRGs might
join with state Civil Liberties Union Chapters to develop legislation and provide
counsel to provide due process against capricious discharge for corporate and
governmental professionals who legitimately blow the whistle upon unwarranted
organizational secrecy. Whistle-blowing will never be without costs. But by reducing
the prospective level of private sacrifice, and hence the magnitude of courage
required of the responsible professional, the number of instances of courageous
disclosures may actually be substantially increased.
Finally, public discussions have begun to focus upon the modification of Federal
tax incentives (or expenditures) so as to enhance the impact of middle class
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philanthropy in the total scheme of national resource allocation. Among the first
to propose democratizing governmental subventions to philanthropy was the
economist William Vickrey in 1947." Vickrey pointed out that our tax deduction
system in conjunction with the existing level of progressive marginal tax rates could
result in the government awarding $6 to every dollar sacrificed by a wealthy
individual while contributing but 25 cents for every dollar contributed by a small
taxpayer and contributing nothing to a taxpayer with an income too low to be
subject to tax. Vickrey envisaged a consequent plutocratic bias to privately selected
philanthropic institutions. To provide a more populist flavor to a privately
pluralistic process of allocation of government-subsidized resources to private
philanthropy, Vickrey proposed that a flat tax credit equal to 25 percent of the
amount given by each taxpayer be substituted for the present system of charitable
deductions, and its flagrantly regressive implications. A spate of comparable
proposals followed during the next twenty years."'
More recently Paul R. McDaniel," a law professor of taxation has proposed
that charitable deductions be replaced by a system of matching Federal grants in the
interest of democratizing the process of individual grant making. McDaniel
proposed that the percentage of matching grant be elevated in accordance with the
proportion of one's "corrected" adjusted gross income that one contributes. Hoping
to leave the current level of Federal tax expenditures unchanged for the current
level of private sacrificing, McDaniel suggested that the following matching rates
would tend to produce his twin objectives.
Percentage of "Corrected" Matching Federal Grant
Adjusted Gross Income as a Percentage of
Donated Donation
Under 2% 5%
2-3 10
3-4 15
4-5 20
5-6 25
6-7 30
7-8 35
8-9 40
9-10 45
Over 10 50
In 1973 foundation president Alan Pifer of the Carnegie Corporation proposed
that a 50% tax credit be offered to all taxpayers, thus raising for low and middle
wage and salary earners the tax advantage for philanthropy to the highest implicit
level of tax privilege currently received by wage and salary recipients in the
highest bracket.
Pifer admits that his proposal would have reduced government revenues by
approximately 4 billion dollars had it been in operation during 1971. But Pifer does
not shrink in recommending a compensatory offsetting reduction in lower priority
Federal budget items. Pifer explicitly wishes to elevate the proportion of resources
allocated through the private, not-for-profit sector as much as he wishes to
democratize the role of philanthropy--by freeing charitable institutions from the
risks of undue dependence on the wealthy. Even more importantly, and in keeping
with the evolutionary patterns detected in this paper, Pifer contends "reform of
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the charitable deduction would be a step in the direction of decentralization of
decision-making in our society and the encouragement of diversity in the ways we
achieve our social objectives."
Thirdly, Waldemar A. Nielson, foundation consultant and critic, and recent
author of The Big Foundations," last year made the most radical and exciting
proposal to both democratize and rejuvenate pioneering by voluntary associations."
Nielson proposes that every adult citizen be given the following additional option
under the present revenue code: a fully matching (100%) tax credit set tentatively
at $100 per year ($200 on a joint return) upon presentation of documentation of
gifts of that much or more to bona fide charity. Interestingly, even the poor
would be encouraged to make "costless" gifts which they might conceivably choose
to use to support their own community action programs, or even a WIRG (Welfare
Interest Research Group).
Nielson wishes to eliminate the connotation of plutocracy from philanthropy.
He recognizes that his proposal could require up to $8 billion in additional taxes
or cutback in alternative Federal programs. But Nielson believes that such
democratization of charity is essential to reaffirm "the fundamental American idea
that individual citizens should take as much responsibility as possible for supporting
voluntary actions for the common good."
Nielson sees such "revenue sharing" from the federal government to the
private non-profit sector by way of individual decision-making as essential if
"we mean what we say about the importance of pluralism, diversity and limited
government." Indeed Nielson's proposal has all the moxie of a Baumol-Olson
proposition with respect to employing the mix of governmental coercive taxation and
lump-sum conditional subsidies to induce an egalitarian increment of atomistically
allocated grants to the privately philanthropic sector of the economy.
Not surprisingly, Nielson singles out "Naderism" as one direction in philanthropy
in which his version of "revenue sharing" might particularly encourage young
people with modest incomes to contribute.
Finally, we may expect to hear proposals to remove the severe limitations upon
lobbying activities of philanthropic organizations which seek to qualify as bonafide
charities for donors who seek tax deductions or tax credits. The limitations
seriously circumscribe public interest-type associations. The realization is gradually
spreading that corporations, and their trade associations, for over a decade have
been fully entitled to take as a legitimate business expense any and all of their
lobbying expenditures. In the instance of corporations this amounts to about
a 50 percent tax subsidy. Moreover, labor unions have always been entitled to engage
in unlimited lobbying activity without jeopardy to full deductability by union
members of their union dues.
Why should consumer, environmental, cultural, and "clean government" lobbies
by financially handicapped as they attempt to guarantee that all interests will
get to be represented before our legislature and their committees?
Indeed Congressman John Anderson18 (R., Ill.), co-author of the Common
Cause favored Anderson-Udall bill for reform of electoral campaign expenditures,
has warned the public not to expect a miraculous reduction in the powerful influence
of special economic interest groups consequent to adoption of an effective campaign
finance reform. The special economic interest groups will continue to hold a
competitive edge by means of their continual presence and the expert staffing of
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their lobbying operations. Indeed the special economic interests can be expected,
admittedly with some sacrificed trade-off in marginal benefit, to shift some of
that non-tax deductible money from the prohibited area of campaign expenditures
to its tax-deductible lobbying sector. Such a reallocation of funding will further
enrich and empower the lobbying capabilities of the special economic interests
relative to the unsystematic lobbying of general interest groups.
Equity and truly democratic pluralism call for unshackeling the public interest
groups from all current Internal Revenue Service strictures concerning lobbying.
Currently, such well-versed lobbyists as Common Cause and the League of Women
Voters are seriously impeded in their fund-raising efforts by failing to qualify
for I.R.S. tax-deductible status for their donors. On the other hand the Environmental
Defense Fund and many of our contemplated Employee-based Citizens Interest
Research Groups would be impeded in their quantum of allowable lobbying activity
by a need to stay within the narrow allowables established by the I.R.S. to
maintain a tax privilege for their donors.
It would not be unreasonable, however, to find the populist voices which seek
antidotes to expressions of powerlessness of our citizens in the face of big business,
big labor and big government to generate sufficient Congressional votes to repeal
the I.R.S. regulation. Thus positive tax incentives may even be evolving for
middle class funding for substantial public interest lobbying.
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